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DOES INFORMATION BEGET INFORMATION? 
DENNIS S. KARJALA1 
ABSTRACT 
Using the language of mathematics, Professor Polk Wagner 
has recently argued that the impossibility of fully appropriating the 
value of information in a rightsholder leads to the surprising 
conclusion that expanding the degree of control of intellectual 
property rights will, in the long run, increase the sum total of 
information not subject to ownership claims and therefore 
available as part of the cultural and technological base on which 
new growth and development can occur.  Indeed, he claims that 
open information will grow according to the formula for compound 
interest, where the interest rate is 100% plus or minus a factor z 
supposedly related to creation incentives.  This article 
demonstrates that Professor Wagner’s mathematical analysis is 
simply wrong and does not lead to any of the conclusions he 
reaches concerning the growth of open information.  It also shows 
both the difficulties and the dangers of the lay use of the language 
of mathematics in resolving complex social problems even if one 
does the math correctly. 
INTRODUCTION 
¶1 Professor Polk Wagner has argued that the impossibility of fully 
appropriating the value of information in an intellectual property 
rightsholder, such as the owner of a patent or copyright, leads to the 
surprising conclusion that expanding the degree of control of intellectual 
property rights will, in the long run, increase the total information not 
subject to ownership claims.2  This “open information” is then available as 
part of the cultural and technological base on which new growth and 
development can occur.  Professor Wagner’s argument is not that 
intellectual property rights are for limited times, so increased incentives 
generate more works that eventually enter the public domain, thereby 
                                                       
1 Jack E. Brown Professor of Law, Sandra Day O’Connor College of Law, 
Arizona State University.  The author is indebted to Professors Vincent 
Chiappetta and Aaron Fellmeth for many helpful comments on an earlier draft of 
this article. 
2 R. Polk Wagner, Information Wants to Be Free: Intellectual Property and the 
Mythologies of Control, 103 COLUM. L. REV. 995 (2003).  A Westlaw search 
reveals forty-nine citing references to Professor Wagner’s article as of 
November 29, 2006. 
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increasing the supply of open information.3  Rather, Professor Wagner 
argues that the creation of any new work results in new open information 
indirectly associated with the new protected work but sufficiently removed 
from it that the new open information cannot be appropriated as part of the 
original intellectual property right.4  He claims that by giving more control 
over direct uses of the work to the rightsholder, we increase incentives for 
the creation of such works and thereby get more of them.  Even though 
fewer direct uses can be made of protected works after the increase in 
control, the increase in the indirect supply of information will, in the long 
run, more than make up the difference.5  Thus, granting more control to 
authors and inventors and thereby increasing their incentives to create will 
result in more growth of open information than would occur under the 
status quo or under a system of reduced rightsholder control. 
¶2 Professor Wagner’s paper contains much thoughtful and well 
reasoned analysis, but it suffers from a fatal flaw.  He simply assumes that 
the formula for compound interest applies to the growth of open 
information, while his presentation, purporting to use the language of 
mathematics, seriously obfuscates his calculations.  That is, he asserts that 
the amount of open information On at the end of n periods of time is equal 
to the amount that existed at some time in the past O1 multiplied by (1+z)n, 
where z is a growth factor supposedly related to creation incentives.  This 
mathematical formula accurately predicts the value of a bank account 
paying compound interest or the growth of bacteria in a medium of 
unlimited necessary nutrients.  Does it, however, apply to the growth of 
open information—does information beget information like bank accounts 
beget money or bacteria beget offspring, and if so, how?   
¶3 Professor Wagner does not attempt to justify his application of the 
formula for compound interest to information growth.6  This article 
                                                       
3 This “straightforward” argument would be neither new nor, in itself, 
convincing, because it does not consider the loss of derivative works that are not 
created as a result of the extra control the new regime recognizes for 
rightsholders. 
4 Professor Wagner calls this Type III information; Type I is the copyright-
protected work or patented invention itself, while Type II information is directly 
derived from Type I information as cumulative innovation, such as invention 
improvements or copyright derivative works.  Wagner, supra note 2, at 1003–
05. 
5 Id. at 1033. 
6 There are, indeed, some serious studies attempting to show that knowledge has 
been growing exponentially.  For example, Ray Kurzweil argues that the history 
of technology shows exponential growth in technological change; indeed, the 
growth is doubly exponential, in that the exponential growth factor itself has 
been growing with time.  Ray Kurzweil, The Law of Accelerating Returns, 
KURZWEILAI.NET, Mar. 7, 2001, 
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demonstrates that the mathematics purporting to underlie Professor 
Wagner’s argument is simply wrong.  It argues that application of the 
compound interest formula is absurd, especially pursuant to an incentives-
based theory that looks, as his theory purports to do, to people—authors and 
inventors—for the creation of cultural and technological works.  This article 
thus has two goals: First, it explains why Professor Wagner’s erroneous 
claim, which appears in one of our most prestigious law journals, must be 
rejected in the ongoing debate on the appropriate type and scope of 
intellectual property rights.  Second, using Professor Wagner’s basic 
approach as an example, this article also shows both the difficulties and the 
dangers of the lay use of the language of mathematics to address complex 
social problems even if one does the math correctly. 
I. THE WAGNER THEORY 
¶4 Authors and inventors create new information.  Our whole theory of 
intellectual property rests on the assumption that, by giving authors and 
inventors legal protection for information they create, we get more 
information of the types society deems desirable than we would have under 
a regime that allowed free copying of all generally available information.  
Intellectual property laws thus give information creators a degree of control 
over the information they produce as an incentive to produce it.  But does 
information itself beget new information?  That is, does the availability of 
information to human beings in itself lead to the creation of new 
information? 
¶5 At first, the question seems absurd.  Notwithstanding the human 
tendency to anthropomorphize, information by itself is inanimate and 
incapable of reproducing itself, let alone creating new information.  Still, 
the current supply of information does, in a sense, lead to new information.  
Movies and books lead to movie and book reviews.  Scientific papers lead 
to new research and new papers.  Yesterday’s ball game leads to a new 
dynamic for today’s game.  Such examples are literally without limit.  
While they all involve human intermediaries in the creation of the new 
information, some of the new information clearly would either be different 
or would not exist at all but for the earlier information.  Therefore, the 
amount and quality of information we as a society generate at any given 
time must somehow depend on the size and quality of the existing 
information base.  The amount of information available at any given time is 
thus a complex function of the incentives society gives to information 
producers and the quantity and quality of information on which those 
producers can build. 
                                                                                                                          
http://www.kurzweilai.net/articles/art0134.html?printable=1.  A similar 
conclusion can perhaps be inferred from some of Isaac Asimov’s work.  See 
infra note 27. 
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A.  Professor Wagner’s Model 
¶6 Professor Wagner models this phenomenon by considering a series 
of time periods of unspecified length during which creative authors or 
inventors produce information.7  The total information I produced in such a 
time frame consists of: iI, the Type I information relating to the core 
creations (e.g., patented inventions or copyright-protected works); iII, the 
Type II information directly related to and derived from those core 
creations; and iIII, the Type III information that results from Types I and II 
information but is beyond the control of any intellectual property rights.8  
Therefore, the total information produced during the given time period is I = 
iI + iII + iIII.  Only the open information O however, is freely available for 
later authors and inventors to use in new creations.  All Type III information 
is by definition open, and certain percentages of Types I and II information 
are also open because intellectual property rights grant less than full control 
to the rightsholders.9  If the respective percentages of these two types of 
information that are open are cI and cII, the amount of open information 
produced during this time period is  
O = cIiI + cIIiII + iIII (1) 
¶7 Equation (1) represents the status quo—the amount of new open 
information that will be created within the given time period if we make no 
changes in the incentive schemes of intellectual property law.  Professor 
Wagner now multiplies Equation (1) by a factor z reflecting the change in 
                                                       
7 Because Professor Wagner does not expressly tell his readers that he applies 
the formula for compound interest to the growth of open information, it is 
necessary to present his purported mathematical analysis in some detail to 
uncover the absence of any basis, at least within his analysis, for doing so.  
While I find his mathematical notation clumsy, I adopt it here to allow easier 
comparison of my analysis to his.  To keep the discussion as simple as possible, 
I also grant him most of his assumptions, challenging them only in footnote. 
8 Type I information is the copyright-protected work of authorship or the 
patented invention itself.  Type II information derives directly from such 
underlying creations, such as improvements in the patent context and derivative 
works, like movies made from books, in the copyright context.  Type III 
information derives from the underlying creation but is beyond the control of the 
intellectual property rightsholder.  The new technological avenues that are 
opened by pioneering inventions like the steam engine and the transistor or new 
genres of television shows that follow a successful first example are Type III 
information.  Wagner, supra note 2, at 1003–06. 
9 Some information may be open because rightsholders choose not to assert 
some of their rights, as with open-source software.  Professor Wagner has not 
included this type of information in his model, and I ignore it as well.  I can see 
no reason how including such information in the model would change any of the 
fundamentals. 
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creation incentives that results from increasing or decreasing rightsholder 
control: 
O(z) = z[cIiI + cIIiII + iIII] (2) 
¶8 The incentives factor z is unity for the status quo; it goes up with 
increases in rightsholder control (increased incentives) and down with 
decreases in such control.  Because iI is itself a function of z, it seems like 
double counting to multiply again by z in Equation (2).  Professor Wagner 
apparently assumes that iI is a constant and that all of the increase comes 
from linear multiplication by z.  Much of the rest of this article questions the 
apparent assumption of such a linear relationship. 
¶9 Of course, the coefficients cI and cII also vary with z.  They vary 
inversely with the change in control, that is, with z, because by definition 
they represent the amounts of Type I and II information not, under 
intellectual property law, subject to the control of the rightsholder.  For 
example, if the law changes to reduce the number of uses of copyright-
protected works deemed “fair use,” a copyright owner will have more 
control over the uses that can be made of Type I information, so a smaller 
percentage of iI will be open information (cI decreases).  On the other hand, 
to the extent greater copyright owner control increases the incentive to 
create new works, the amount of Type I information iI should increase.  
Similarly, if the notion of “expression” is expanded so that more works are 
considered infringing derivative works, more Type II information will be 
subject to copyright owners’ control, causing less of iII to be open (cII 
decreases).10  Presumably, less Type II information will also be created with 
the increase in rightsholder control because more such works will require a 
rightsholder’s permission and the increased transaction costs will prevent 
some works from ever being created.11  Note that nothing in Equation (2) 
implies a “feedback” of the amount of open information onto itself; that is, 
Equation (2) includes no term relating the amount of open information O 
                                                       
10 Professor Wagner recognizes, but does not address in detail, the possibility 
that Type II information may also be, or become, Type I information.  Id. at 
1018 n.97.  For example, a movie made from a novel has much original material 
that is protected, if made with permission, as a derivative work.  Presumably, the 
original elements of a protected derivative work constitute Type I information, 
while the elements that would, but for the copyright owner’s authorization, have 
made it an infringing derivative work are Type II information.  Again, the 
critique of Professor Wagner’s theory contained herein does not depend on these 
details and therefore grants him, for present purposes, whatever assumptions he 
is making in this regard. 
11 I address later some of the difficulties this Type I, II, III taxonomy of 
information has for a correct analysis of the open-information growth problem.  
It is considerably more complex than Professor Wagner’s model, even correctly 
implemented, can account for. 
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created during the period to the amount existing at the beginning of the 
period.  It simply states that, if we increase control, and thereby creation 
incentives, we will increase society’s total amount of open information by 
the amount O calculated according to the equation. 
B.  The Three Scenarios Considered 
¶10 Professor Wagner now considers three scenarios.  Scenario 1 is the 
status quo, where he takes cI to be 10% and cII to be 40%; scenario 2 
reduces rightsholder control, thereby opening up more Types I and Type II 
information to free use, and takes cI to be 40% and cII to be 60%; and 
scenario 3 gives perfect control over Types I and II information to the 
rightsholders, so that both cI and cII are zero.  Apparently, he also takes his 
change-in-incentives factor z to be 1 for scenario 1 (the status quo), 2/3 for 
scenario 2 (reduction of incentives by 1/3) and 4/3 for scenario 3 (increase 
of incentives by 1/3).12  He then seeks to compare the increases in the 
                                                       
12 Professor Wagner is not entirely clear about what he means by an increase in 
incentives (via increased creator control over the product).  Because he sees an 
increase or decrease by 1/3 in the total information output I when z is increased 
or decreased, it appears that his definition of incentives is based on the results of 
whatever change in control he hypothesizes.  That is to say, if we make a change 
in control that results in iI output increasing by 1/3, then by definition, we have 
increased incentives, and therefore z, by 1/3.  There is no obvious reason why 
the coefficients in his Equation (2), cI and cII, should change by the same or even 
a closely related percentage.  Thus, when z decreases by 1/3 in Professor 
Wagner’s scenario 2, his cI goes from 10% to 40%, which means a decrease in 
rightsholder control by 1/3 (from 90% to 60%).  His cII goes from 40% to 60%, 
which also means a decrease in rightsholder control by 1/3 (from 60% to 40%).  
I can think of no reason, and Professor Wagner supplies none, that a change in 
incentives measured by changes in output would bear any linear relation, let 
alone equality, to the changes in the level of control society gives over 
information Types I and II.  Indeed, in Professor Wagner’s full control scenario 
3, cI and cII go from 10% and 40%, respectively, to zero, representing an 
increase in rightsholder control of about 11% for Type I information  (90% to 
100%) and 67% for Type II information (60% to 100%).  These changes for 
scenario 3 average out to a little more than a 1/3 increase in rightsholder control 
(39%—recall that he that he takes iI and iII to be equal), so he cannot be 
assuming a linear relationship, either.  This detail would demand closer 
discussion if Professor Wagner’s basic theory represented the real world in any 
meaningful way.  Indeed, he emphasizes that a crucial implication of his theory 
is the need for a closer examination of the relationship between control and 
incentives.  See Wagner, supra note 2, at 1023.  This critique is aimed at his 
assumption of exponential growth based on the incentive factor z, so it matters 
little here exactly what z is or how it is derived.  
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amount of open information created during the given time period, assuming 
that iI = iII = iIII = 1.13 
¶11 Applying Equation (2), the increase in the amount of open 
information that results during time period 1 for each of the three scenarios 
is O11 = 1[0.1 + 0.4 + 1] = 1.5 for scenario 1, O12 = 2/3[0.4 + 0.6 + 1] = 2/3 
x 2 = 4/3 = 1.333 for scenario 2, and O13 = 4/3[0.0 + 0.0 +1] = 1.333 for 
scenario 3.14  How much open information is then produced in the second 
time period?  By hypothesis, incentives for producers of works (by giving 
them the same, less, or more control over their creations) have not changed 
from the first time period.  Under scenario 3 (increased incentives) the 
change has resulted in higher productivity by existing creators or in 
inducing more people to become creators.  The opposite has occurred under 
the reduced incentives of scenario 2, and nothing has changed with respect 
to incentives for status quo scenario 1.  Unless the total amount of open 
information itself somehow begets new information, perhaps by allowing 
the group of creators that now exists to work more efficiently in response to 
the change in incentives, we should get identical increases in open 
information in time period 2 and, indeed, in all successive time periods.  
Recall that Equation (2) does not incorporate any term representing 
efficiency “feedback” to creators based on the total amount of open 
information available to them to work with that increases their productivity.  
                                                       
13 This assumption would also require much more careful analysis if the 
underlying theory were otherwise valid.  For present purposes, however, we may 
accept it, because it reflects only the initial conditions for the analysis.  If we 
assume information really grows exponentially at a rate dependent on 
intellectual property incentives, and if we agree with Professor Wagner to look 
only to the long term, the initial conditions will make little difference, as long as 
we define “long” to be a period of sufficient length that the initial conditions are 
largely irrelevant.  This is always possible with exponential growth.  See infra 
note 19 and accompanying text. 
14 Professor Wagner seems not to apply his incentive factor z to this first 
iterative period, so the numbers he gets for the increase in the amount in his first 
period are 1.5, 2, and 1 for the three scenarios, respectively.  Wagner, supra note 
2, at 1020–21.  By hypothesis he has changed the incentives for scenarios 2 and 
3.  He has stated that the change in incentives will be reflected in changes in the 
coefficients cI and cII, the amounts of iI and iII, respectively, that cannot be 
appropriated by the rightsholder.  But he asserts that the total number of works 
produced will also change, which is why he introduces the factor z. Given that 
scenarios 2 and 3 both reflect a change in incentives, it would seem that the total 
amount of open information produced during the first period should take into 
account the assumed change in the number of works produced during the period, 
which means multiplying by z.  Fortunately, whatever choice is made on this 
issue does not affect any subsequent conclusions under either Professor 
Wagner’s method of analysis or the one presented here (because his assumption 
of exponential growth swamps all these details).  
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Assuming for the moment, therefore, that there is no such feedback 
(Professor Wagner’s theory does not postulate any), it is easy to see that 
open information under Equation (2) grows faster under the status quo and 
equally slower in both the reduced and the increased incentives scenarios 
(increasing by 1.5 in each time period for scenario 1 compared to 1.333 in 
the others). 
C.  The Leap to the Compound Interest Formula 
¶12 The above linear increase, with the status quo winning, is the 
logical implication of Professor Wagner’s equations.  Professor Wagner, 
however, does not calculate the growth in open information in this way.  
Rather, he drops Equation (2) entirely and uses a completely different 
formula, not presented in his paper, that results in the following table for the 























































Professor Wagner’s results for the end of period 1, under the assumption 
that the amounts of the three different types of information are equal (to 
unity, for simplicity), follow directly from Equation (1) and the values of 
the cI and cII coefficients that have been assumed for each of the three 
scenarios.16  However, the remaining entries in the table are calculated from 
the following formula: 
On = On-1 + zOn-1 = On-1(1+z)     (3) 
                                                       
15 Wagner, supra note 2, at 1021 tbl.5. 
16 His numbers for the end of period 1 should be 1.5, 1.333, and 1.333, for the 
three scenarios, respectively.  For some reason, Professor Wagner does not 
apply his incentives factor z, shown in Equation (2), to this first iteration period.  
See supra note 14. 
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where On is the total amount of open information at the end of period n.17  
Thus, instead of calculating the amount of open information produced 
during a given period and adding that to the total of the prior periods, he 
assumes that an amount equal the total amount existing at end of the prior 
period On-1 multiplied by the incentives factor z, is produced in the next 
single period.  This amount is then added to the total existing at the end of 
the prior period to get the new total.  This is information begetting 
information with a vengeance—startling if correct.  There may be some 
areas in which a particular work does spawn exponential growth, at least for 
a while, but Professor Wagner’s theory applies to all information, from your 
laundry list to the transistor. 
¶13 To test the plausibility of Professor Wagner’s claim, we may look at 
how Equation (3) relates the total amount of open information at the end of 
period n to the amount existing at the end of the first period: 
On = On-1 + zOn-1 = On-1(1+z) = On-2(1+z)2 =  . . . . = O1(1+z)n-1    (4) 
¶14 Inserting the values of z for Professor Wagner’s three scenarios, we 
see that  
1. On = 2n-1O1 (scenario 1, status quo) 
2. On = (5/3)n-1O1 (scenario 2, reduced control)      (5) 
3. On = (7/3)n-1O1 (scenario 3, increased control) 
¶15 Thus, at the end of period 5, the amount of open information under 
scenario 1 is 24(1.5) = 24; under scenario 2 is (5/3)4(2) = 7.72(2) = 15.44; 
and under scenario 3 is (7/3)4(1) = 29.64.  These numbers exactly match 
those shown in Professor Wagner’s table.18  Although the value of O1 
differs for each scenario, that initial value becomes irrelevant with a 
sufficient number of time periods, because it is swamped by the exponential 
growth that this model assumes for information.  As a matter of pure 
mathematics, there will invariably be a period N beyond which scenario 3 
will always outperform scenario 1, which in turn will always outperform 
scenario 2, regardless of their respective values of O1,19 and the differences 
keep getting larger.  Thus, Equation (4) necessarily implies that information 
begets information without the intervention of authors or inventors, except 
                                                       
17 In a private communication, Professor Wagner confirmed to me that this is the 
formula he used to create his table as well as the graphs shown in his article.  E-
mail from R. Polk Wagner, Professor of Law, University of Pennsylvania Law 
School, to Dennis S. Karjala, Jack E. Brown Professor of Law, Sandra Day 
O’Connor College of Law, Arizona State University (Aug. 13, 2005, 4:58 MST) 
(on file with author).   
18 See Wagner, supra note 2, at 1021 tbl.5. 
19 That is, there exists a number N such that (7/3)n-1O1 > 2n-1O1 > (5/3)n-1O1 
whenever n > N, regardless of any variance in O1 from one scenario to another. 
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through the incentives factor z, which having been increased or decreased 
once, should remain steady thereafter until a second change in control leads 
to another increase or decrease in incentives.  It is, however, far from 
obvious how the amount of open public information can be said to be an 
exponentially growing factor multiplied by the amount of open information 
generated during the first period after a change in incentives.20  
¶16 Equation (4), which is the equation actually used by Professor 
Wagner to calculate the growth of open information, is precisely the 
formula for compound interest: 
FV = PV(1+r)n     (6) 
where FV is the future value, PV is the present value, r is the interest rate, 
and n is the number of compounding periods.21  The future amount (value), 
On, of open information at the end of period n is equal to the amount (value) 
present at the beginning O1 multiplied by the nth power of one plus the 
growth rate.22  Professor Wagner makes no effort to justify his use of the 
compound interest formula to make his calculations, nor the 100% growth 
rate he assumes for the status quo.  (Recall that Equation (4) cannot be 
derived from Equation (2), which implies a linear rather than exponential 
growth for open information.)  Mathematical modeling can be useful when 
the model approximates how the real world operates.  Without justification 
that the compound interest model does actually approximate in some 
plausible way the operation of the real world of information growth, 
Professor Wagner has shown no more than that he knows how to calculate 
compound interest and that, given enough time, a higher interest rate always 
wins over a lower rate regardless of the amount of initial principal.  All of 
the “mathematics” in his article is irrelevant to the crucial question of how 
much control intellectual property regimes should give to rightsholders and 
how that control relates to information growth. 
II. WHY “OPEN INFORMATION” GROWTH IS NOT EXPONENTIAL 
¶17 The exponential increases assumed by Professor Wagner and shown 
in his table and the accompanying graphs do not fit any theory of incentives 
for the production of creative works that comports with the reality of 
intellectual property law.  They simply cannot be correct.  Effectively, 
                                                       
20 The factors 2, 5/3, and 7/3 for scenarios 1, 2, and 3, respectively, result from 
Professor Wagner’s assumption that open information grows by his incentive 
factor z multiplied by the total amount of open information existing at the end of 
the previous period.  When the two are added to get a new total, the factor 
becomes (z+1).   
21 E.g., CHARLES J. GOETZ, LAW AND ECONOMICS 158 (1984). 
22 The exponent in Equation (4) is n-1 rather than Equation (6)’s n simply 
because we numbered the first iterative period “1” rather than “0.” 
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Professor Wagner has arranged his model so that the increased incentives 
operate on works rather than on creators, notwithstanding that his assumed 
changes in incentives come from giving creators more control over their 
intellectual property.  He apparently assumes that increasing incentives in 
one period will not only increase the number of works created as a result of 
the new spur to authorship and invention but that the now increased supply 
of information will itself be the generator of yet new information in the 
succeeding period.  This information self-generation is essentially 
independent of what authors and inventors are doing, because, as Equation 
(4) shows, the result after n periods depends solely on the initial amount of 
open information and the supposed incentive factor z.23 
¶18 Works do not create works, however.  Authors and inventors create 
works. We vary the incentive structure to induce authors and inventors to 
change their behavior.  If the changes succeed, and authors and inventors do 
begin to create more works, more people become authors and inventors, or 
both, then further increases in creative production can only come from again 
increasing the number24 or by raising the production efficiency of authors 
and inventors.  The former might be accomplished by yet another increase 
in incentives, but absent such an increase or a rise in creator efficiency we 
should expect the supply rate of new works to increase and then level off at 
a now higher point for creative works—an arithmetic rather than a 
geometric increase in the amount of information. 
¶19 This brings us to the question of whether the steadily growing 
amount of open information (under any of Professor Wagner’s scenarios) 
leads to the required increase in creator efficiency.  We can imagine cases in 
which the existence of a pioneering advance in technology or art paves the 
way for a later author or inventor to develop the idea further and where, 
without the initial advance, the second creator would have been stymied.  
Professor Wagner discusses a number of areas in which a new work has 
stimulated a large response by people who came later (e.g., hybrid corn 
leading to other hybridization technologies, steam engines leading to other 
                                                       
23 Equation (4) might bear some relationship to reality if the incentive scheme in 
question is iterative, in the sense that in every period we increase incentives by 
the incentive factor z.  Indeed, Equation (4) might then be true by definition if 
the incentive factor z is itself defined as the increase in information that actually 
follows a change in incentives.  See supra note 12.  I, at least, have utterly no 
idea how we might do that, and nothing in Professor Wagner’s article suggests 
awareness that iterative increases in incentives, rather than a single increase at a 
given time, are necessary to make his theory even plausibly valid.    
24 For simplicity, in referring to increases in the “number of authors” I mean to 
include both increases in the total number of people producing works of 
authorship and any increase in the amount of time spent on producing works of 
authorship by people who were already working as authors. 
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rotary motion machines, semiconductors leading to many advances in 
binary logic, and a given television show followed by an entire genre of 
similar shows).25 
¶20 Examples like this, however, do not show how much the total 
amount of open information has contributed to these pioneering advances or 
by how much these pioneering advances themselves actually increased the 
total beyond what would have occurred without them.  After all, many of 
the people taking part in follow-on creations may well have been creating 
something else absent the pioneering advance on which they actually did 
base their work.  Moreover, the pioneering advances, measured solely as a 
quantum of information, constitute a very small portion of the total.  That a 
pioneering advance can lead to exponential growth in that field, at least for 
a time, in no way shows that all open information leads to such exponential 
growth.  In fact, we would expect that most information will lead to little 
further growth at all.  How many patents actually lead to commercially 
exploited products, for example, and how many of those that are exploited 
are pioneer in the sense of the transistor?26  How many films, novels, and 
paintings, not to mention speeches, lecture notes, and shampoo instructions, 
are seen, read, or admired to any significant extent at all, let alone serve as 
inspiration for exponential growth? 
¶21 One can also posit examples in which the total amount of existing 
information has a negative effect on subsequent creator incentives, such as 
where a given field or genre becomes so crowded that later creators feel 
they have little to add and would not do well against so much competition.  
In short, while the amount of open information available to current creators 
on which to build new works probably does have some effect on creation 
incentives, we need a much more complete theory of the connection 
between open information and creator productivity.  Professor Wagner, at 
any rate, has provided no basis for his implicit assumption that the total 
amount of open information grows exponentially by a power of one plus his 
incentive-change factor, in other words, like compound interest at a 100+% 
interest rate.27 
                                                       
25 Wagner, supra note 2, at 1007. 
26 For some extremes in the invention area, see generally TED VANCLEAVE, 
TOTALLY ABSURD INVENTIONS—AMERICA’S GOOFIEST PATENTS (2001); KENJI 
KAWAKAMI, 101 UNUSELESS JAPANESE INVENTIONS (1995) (describing 
inventions that are almost useless in a campy way that gives them an honored 
status). 
27 Ray Kurzweil has developed a “law of accelerating returns,” which argues 
that both biological and technological processes involve positive feedback 
mechanisms that lead to exponential growth.  Kurzweil, supra note 6.  He 
concedes a law of diminishing returns for any given technology, but observes 
that, at least up to the present, a new technology has always come along to keep 
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¶22 We also know from nearly every sphere of activity that there is a 
law of diminishing returns.  Professor Wagner’s theory starts where it 
should, by concentrating on creators.  Giving creators more control, he 
posits, would likely spur them into more creative activity (and encourage 
others not currently working as authors or inventors to try their hands).  
That is a plausible assumption and one around which we can understand 
trying to build a general theory of information creation.  Such a theory will 
depend on the relationship between creator control and incentives or 
increased output, and Professor Wagner understands this fully.28  The 
                                                                                                                          
things growing.  Thus, vacuum tubes give rise to a burst of technology that 
continues to grow at increasing rates until displaced by the transistor, followed 
by the integrated circuit, the computer, and finally computers designing 
computers.  Isaac Asimov has also reviewed the growth of knowledge generally 
(not just technological knowledge).   ISAAC ASIMOV, ASIMOV’S CHRONOLOGY 
OF SCIENCE AND DISCOVERY (1989).  Asimov makes no explicit claim 
concerning the growth rate, but his account reveals that 2 million years passed 
between human bipedalism and the use of stone tools, another 1.5 million years 
to the harnessing of fire, 300,000 years to the advent of religion, and 180,000 
years more to the development of human art, the bow and arrow, and oil lamps.  
Id. at 1–9.  Then, starting about 8,000 B.C.E. things start to speed up, with new 
major developments every 1,000 years or so, then every few hundred, then 
roughly every decade until the Renaissance, then every few years, and so on 
until modern times when there are often ten to twenty major developments in a 
single year.  See id. at 10–654.  Obviously, Asimov sees scientific knowledge as 
having grown exponentially, essentially from the beginning.  Neither Kurzweil 
nor Asimov, however, makes any attempt to relate the growth they observe to 
the incentives of intellectual property law.  Moreover, both Kurzweil and 
Asimov see the exponential growth of major developments in human knowledge 
as having continued for millennia, during most of which society did not even 
have any intellectual property protection for creative individuals.  For Kurzweil, 
it is always a key pioneering discovery that keeps the process going.  While it is 
possible that these key discoveries would have come faster had intellectual 
property protections been stronger, we need some theoretical or empirical 
framework before we go about increasing rightsholder control under intellectual 
property law, because we can lose as well as gain when we strengthen such 
rights.  Moreover, Kurzweil’s theory applies only to the fruits of technology.  He 
supplies no basis for saying that copyright subject matter, such as literature, art, 
and music, grows in the same way.  Even the most casual observation would 
suggest that it does not.  For example, while the novel was once a new form of 
literature, and cubism a new form of art, and they both inspired numerous later 
creators, I have seen no evidence that growth inspired by the novel or any given 
painting school, is exponential. 
28 Wagner, supra note 2, at 1023 (“The analysis suggests that the production of 
open information is determined by the details of the control-incentives 
relationship. . . .  [T]he impact of intellectual property policy proposals are best 
evaluated according to their effects on incentives, rather than on their perceived 
effects on the public domain or open information”). 
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question is how giving more control to creators over their creations can 
continue to spur production at an exponentially increasing rate.  Indeed, 
nearly all of human experience suggests precisely the opposite, namely, 
diminishing returns:  Once the supply of open information gets very large, 
further increases can contribute very little to the production of new 
information.  In particular, any theory of creativity that depends on the total 
volume of open information available to creators to build on must recognize 
that efficiency cannot exceed 100%.29  Once that level is reached, the 
existing group of authors and inventors simply cannot produce any more 
than they do already, regardless of how much more new information we 
give them to work with, so all growth would have to come from increasing 
the number of working authors and inventors.  Yet, without additional 
rounds of increased incentives, what reason is there to expect that more 
people will try their hands at the creative arts? 
¶23 Professor Wagner might argue that the increased supply of new 
information will induce others to join by making it easier for them to be 
authors and inventors.  But this, too, must sooner or later reach some limit.  
Some people could not create economically useful information (the main 
type with which our intellectual property laws are concerned) regardless of 
the size of the existing information base society gives them.  There also may 
be significant limits on the demand side, both from transaction costs and 
from there being only so much time readers can devote to books or drivers 
can devote to operating autos with lots of nifty new patented bells and 
whistles. 
¶24 Therefore, even granting the possibility that a larger supply of open 
information might increase productivity, every valid theory must predict 
some diminishing returns effect.  Moreover, there is utterly no reason to 
think that an increase in creator control would affect the efficiency with 
which creators use open information.  How creative persons discover, 
extract, and use open information to produce new works is a fascinating 
question but one about which we know very little.  Giving a creator more 
                                                       
29 Professor Chiappetta has pointed out to me in a private communication that 
even though individual efficiency cannot exceed 100%, changes in the tools that 
creators use to produce or users employ to consume information can still drive 
the absolute output higher, even though all producers are operating at their 
capacity.  E-mail from Vincent F. Chiappetta, Professor of Law, Willamette 
University, to Dennis S. Karjala, Jack E. Brown Professor of Law, Sandra Day 
O’Connor College of Law, Arizona State University (July 30, 2006, 11:21 MST) 
(on file with author).  That is correct, but we are now considering the effect of a 
change in rightsholder control, and to do that we should hold other forces as 
constant as possible.  Nothing in Professor Wagner’s theory depends on or 
includes consideration of improvements in information production or 
consumption technologies. 
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control of her work product, by hypothesis, will induce her to work harder 
(or to switch into the creativity business), but how does that increase her 
natural talents for using the existing base of open information?  Finally, 
even under Professor Wagner’s theory, correctly applied (that is to say, 
additively), the status quo results in the production of 1.5 units of open 
information in his first iteration period, while the increased control scenario 
gives only 1.33.30  Consequently, to the extent the amount of open 
information does make creators more efficient, we should still do better 
under the status quo than we do under Professor Wagner’s increased-control 
scenario, because they have more open information to work with after the 
first period and the lead continues to build linearly thereafter. 
III.  TOWARD A REAL-WORLD THEORY OF INCENTIVES 
¶25 A reasonably accurate model of the growth of open information 
would be far more complex than Professor Wagner’s.  Staying as close as 
possible to Professor Wagner’s notation, let us return to Equation (1): 
O = cIiI + cIIiII + iIII (1) 
We can now try applying Equation (1) to a few examples to see how we might 
adjust the model to bring it somewhat closer to reality. 
A.  Expiration of Rights 
¶26 Equation (1) seems to miss an important contributor to the public 
domain (and therefore to open information)—namely, those works whose 
copyrights or patents expire in the given period.  Because we are interested 
in the effect of changes in incentives for the creation of works, however, we 
can perhaps treat this factor as a constant for periods of equal length, 
because the number of works falling into the public domain, in the short-
term at least, is determined by the number of works that were created at 
various times in the past, before the new incentives went into effect.  Of 
course, if incentives do increase the number of works created and we wait 
long enough, those works will enter the public domain and the “constant” in 
the equation representing their contribution will begin to increase.  In the 
short term, however, the differences in contributions to open information 
from the number of works entering the public domain due to copyright and 
patent expiration may not be significant from one period to the next.31 
                                                       
30 In fact, Professor Wagner concludes that the more-control scenario 3 results in 
only one unit in the first period.  See supra note 14.  That, too, we place by the 
way. 
31 Patents, of course, expire much faster than copyrights and presumably should 
be accounted for somehow.  Doing so, however, would require our specifying 
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B.  Interdependent Variables 
¶27 The bigger problem with the model underlying Professor Wagner’s 
Equation (1)32 is that all of the five variables in Equation (1) are themselves 
dependent on the incentives factor z, which in turn makes them dependent 
on one another.  The result is very complex and nonlinear mathematics.  
Under Professor Wagner’s analysis, for example, increasing incentives by 
giving stronger controls to the copyright (or patent) owner reduces the 
constants cI and cII in Equation (1).  However, by hypothesis, increased 
incentives will also increase the supply of Type I information iI and that, 
under Professor Wagner’s theory, automatically increases the indirect Type 
III information iIII generated by the Type I information.  If the decrease in cI 
is counterbalanced by an increase in iI, that together with the increase in iIII 
would imply an increase in the amount of open information.  (In Professor 
Wagner’s perfect control scenario 3, cI is zero, so all of the increase has to 
come from iIII.)  However, increased control should also reduce cII, and that 
may not be offset by an increase in iII.  That is, increased control by the 
rightsholder leaves less of her work free for building new works by others, 
which in turn can reduce iII, the new derivative works based directly on iI.  
This reduction in iII can directly reduce iI as well, because, as Professor 
Wagner realizes,33 many new works that are derivative from Type I 
information will themselves be eligible for intellectual property protection.34 
¶28 The result under a correct application of Professor Wagner’s model, 
therefore, is a bit messy, to say the least.  It is insufficient simply to 
multiply Equation (1) by a factor z representing a change in incentives and 
start calculating, even if one calculates correctly (that is, additively) from 
then on.  All five variables in Equation (1), namely, iI, iII, iIII, cI, and cII, are 
themselves functions of z that do not move in the same direction when z 
(i.e., incentives or control) is changed.  This is a problem likely to bedevil 
any mathematical model of human behavior.  If we knew even the general 
shape of these functional dependencies, we could perhaps draw some 
general conclusions, but we do not.  One thing seems clear, however:  
Whatever the character of these variables, one cannot calculate growth or 
diminution of the amount of open information by simply iteratively 
multiplying a constant factor, however that factor is derived, over and over 
again. 
                                                                                                                          
the time period in question more precisely, so that we know how to bring the 20-
year patent term into the model. 
32 The model underlying Equations (1) and (2) is not the compound interest 
model Professor Wagner uses to do his calculations.  See supra text 
accompanying note 15. 
33 Id. at 1018 n.97. 
34 See supra note 10 and accompanying text. 
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C.  A Case Study:  Term Extensions 
¶29 A simple example might help bring the difficulties into the open.  
Consider the recent extension of the copyright term in the United States, 
from life plus fifty years to life plus seventy years, retroactively covering 
works published after 1922.35  While it is doubtful that this term extension 
had any effect on creation incentives in the real world,36 there is a 
theoretical possibility that incentives did increase slightly.37  Under 
Professor Wagner’s analysis, that is enough to make it a positive 
contributor, in the long run, to the amount of open information available to 
our society.  But consider what the term extension actually brings about:  
By hypothesis we will assume that it results in some (small) increase in new 
works due to the now higher incentive to create new works.  That should 
increase Type I information slightly, and under Professor Wagner’s theory 
it should also increase Type III because some Type III always develops 
from Type I.  However, for twenty years (starting in 1998) there will be 
effectively no additions to the public domain due to expiration of copyright 
on previously protected works.  That means that works that otherwise would 
have been available to current authors as a basis for creating new works 
                                                       
35 Sonny Bono Copyright Term Extension Act, P.L. 105-298 tit. I, 112 Stat. 
2827 (1998) (codified at 17 U.S.C. §§ 108, 203, 301–304).  For works published 
after 1922 and before 1964, the term was extended only if copyright in the work 
had been validly renewed in the twenty-eighth year after publication.  17 U.S.C.  
§ 304(b).  Works published after 1963 and before 1977 automatically have their 
initial 28-year terms renewed by 67 years, for a total of 95 years.  Id. 
§ 304(a)(2).  Works published after 1977 have a term of either life plus seventy 
years (individual authors) or ninety-five years (entity authors), and renewal for 
them is not an issue.  Id. § 302. 
36 In his dissent in Eldred v. Ashcroft, Justice Breyer observed: 
Regardless, even if this cited testimony were meant more specifically to 
tell Congress that somehow, somewhere, some potential author might 
be moved by the thought of great-grandchildren receiving copyright 
royalties a century hence, so might some potential author also be 
moved by the thought of royalties being paid for two centuries, five 
centuries, 1,000 years, “ ‘til the End of Time.” And from a rational 
economic perspective the time difference among these periods makes 
no real difference. The present extension will produce a copyright 
period of protection that, even under conservative assumptions, is 
worth more than 99.8% of protection in perpetuity (more than 99.99% 
for a songwriter like Irving Berlin and a song like Alexander’s Ragtime 
Band). 
537 U.S. 186, 255–56 (2003) (Breyer, J., dissenting). 
37 See Luck’s Music Library, Inc. v. Gonzales, 407 F.3d 1262, 1264 (D.C. Cir. 
2005) (stating that the possibility of participation in future legislative expansions 
of copyright affects the expected reward for authorship). 
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(more iI) remain subject to authorial control, and the transaction costs 
associated with licensing those still-protected works will reduce the number 
of new works of this type that are created, in comparison to what would 
have been created without the term extension.  This has to count as a 
reduction in iI (to the extent of new material) and iIII (to the extent the 
information contained in the still-protected work fails to get further 
disseminated and discussed).  When one thinks of the number of high 
schools or local drama groups that would like to perform Showboat, a single 
1923 work that was “saved” from the public domain by the Sonny Bono 
Act, it is difficult to imagine that the purely theoretical increase in 
incentives from the Act can overcome with new iI the iI and iIII losses that 
continued protection engenders.38 
¶30 What about a purely prospective term extension—one that increases 
the copyright term only for works created after the effective date of the 
extension?  Then we do not have the problem of immediate loss of new 
derivative works and lower cost performances that we suffer from the 
actual, retroactive term extension.  If a prospective extension of the 
copyright term from life plus fifty years to life plus seventy years does 
increase creation incentives, even if only slightly,39 Professor Wagner’s 
theory predicts that, in the long run, it will lead to more open information.  
This case is much closer but still not airtight.  If incentives for new works 
increase, we will get more Type I information and thereby more Type III 
information.  We do not start losing anything under this prospective system 
for at least fifty years, when the new copyrights otherwise would have 
begun to expire.  From then on, however, there will be a rolling period of 
twenty years in which fewer new derivative works will be created, because 
of the continuing control over the underlying works that, without the term 
                                                       
38 In a private communication, Professor Wagner agrees that I apply his theory 
correctly here, if the term extension does increase both control and incentives.  
He thinks that the term extension may increase control but most likely does not 
increase incentives.  If the incentive effect is indeed very small, he believes, the 
retroactive term extension effected by the Sonny Bono Act was a major policy 
error, because it will take too long for the small incentive effect to overtake the 
huge immediate loss from the extended term for existing works.  E-mail from R. 
Polk Wagner, Professor of Law, University of Pennsylvania Law School, to 
Dennis S. Karjala, Jack E. Brown Professor of Law, Sandra Day O’Connor 
College of Law, Arizona State University (Aug. 11, 2005, 12:30 MST) (on file 
with author).  His mathematics purport to show, however, that eventually even 
this most disastrous piece of recent copyright legislation will work out for the 
best, if we just wait long enough (assuming the extension does increase creation 
incentives by some nonzero amount). 
39 This incentive would not include, of course, the “incentive” discussed in the 
previous paragraph that comes from believing that future term extensions will 
also be retroactive. 
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extension, would now be in the public domain and freely available to new 
authors as building blocks.  If the increase in incentives is very slight, we 
will probably not get enough new information in the first fifty years (and 
thereafter) to overcome the loss of new derivative works that begins in fifty 
years.  In any event, it is clear that this loss of new derivative works must 
somehow get taken into consideration in the analysis. 
D.  The Public Domain as an End in Itself 
¶31 This discussion helps focus on another significant problem with 
Professor Wagner’s model—the assumption that increasing the size of the 
public domain is an end in itself.  Professor Wagner focuses on information 
not subject to a copyright owner’s control.  He does this, admittedly, not 
because that is his goal but because that is the goal he attributes to public 
domain advocates.40  The overall social goal, however, is not simply to get 
works into the public domain for the sake of the public domain.  The public 
domain has real economic value to the public in that works no longer 
subject to copyright are generally more broadly available and for a lower 
price.  If this were all there were to it, “the larger the better” might be the 
watchword.  But, as discussed above, the public domain also is the source 
of many new works—in copyright terms, derivative works—that 
themselves are protected by intellectual property law.  The creation of these 
new works does not immediately increase the size of the public domain, but 
that does not mean they are without interest for those who seek to build and 
maintain a vibrant public domain.  A film based on a public domain story, 
such as many films from the Disney company, will be copyright-protected, 
but no public domain advocate of whom I am aware questions the potential 
value of such works to the growth and development of our culture.  The 
goal, then, is the creation of works desired by and available to society, not 
just the total amount of freely available information.  The question is how to 
optimize the underlying factors that affect achievement of this goal, given 
that many of them pull in different directions.   
                                                       
40 Wagner, supra note 2, at 997 & n.8.  He goes on to say that the best way to 
determine the impact of a proposed change in intellectual property rules is to 
consider the change’s effect on incentives.  Id. at 1023.  I do not disagree with 
any of this.  The problem is not with his assumption of a positive relationship 
between control and incentives, which he agrees requires examination.  Id.  The 
problem is that even if you do get the incentives right for the production of iI, his 
mathematical analysis does not throw any light onto the growth of the public 
domain or indeed even onto the growth of iI, because it does not account for the 
loss of derivative works not created due to the increase in primary incentives for 
iI.  Indeed, iI and iII likely move in different directions when creation incentives 
are changed.  See supra ¶27.  Yet, in calculating the growth of open information, 
he multiplies both by the same factor z.   
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CONCLUSION 
¶32 If creation incentives were unnecessary—that is, if authors and 
inventors would do their work regardless of the exclusive rights of 
copyright and patent—we would be better off with no regime of intellectual 
property protection.  But we know that, without some degree of protection, 
we will get fewer works, as authors and inventors turn to more 
(economically) rewarding tasks.  Once some works have been made 
available, others will try to use and improve upon them.  That activity, too, 
leads to new and desirable works.  Too much protection increases creation 
incentives but not enough to counterbalance the loss of even newer works 
that, but for the increased protection, would have been based upon earlier 
works.  Unfortunately, this longstanding, basic intellectual property 
problem is not easily or simply amenable to analysis with the precision of 
mathematics. 
